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Introduction
By the 1970s, it had become customary in academic, media, opposi-
tion, and public opinion circles to criticize Newfoundland and Lab-
rador’s first premier, Joseph ( Joey) Smallwood, for his purported 
“neglect of the fisheries.” I admit to being part of that custom myself, 
and was one of the contributing authors to a little book put out by 
the People’s Commission on Unemployment called Now That We’ve 
Burned Our Boats.1 Smallwood claimed that he never said fishermen 
should burn their boats, nor that he said there would be two jobs for 
every Newfoundlander; but, as the People’s Commission points out 
in the frontispiece to their book, “they have become part of the 
province’s folk-lore.” 
In his excellent biography, Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary, 
Richard Gwyn agrees with the claim that Smallwood neglected the 
fisheries:
This lack of affection for things maritime is reflected in 
what is perhaps the largest puzzle of Smallwood’s admin-
istration: its lack of attention to the fishery. Although the 
fishery supports one Newfoundlander in three, right down 
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to the late 1960’s it has been the most neglected industry 
in the province. For twenty years, Smallwood has sought 
to turn his people away from the sea.2
This has become the conventional wisdom, but the claim that Small-
wood neglected the fisheries is a good example of how a statement can 
become generally agreed upon without having been subjected to criti-
cal examination. Based on a review of the historical record and inter-
views with both Smallwood and Aidan Maloney, who served in several 
key fisheries positions at the time, this article provides such a critical 
examination.
The National Convention and Fisheries Jurisdiction, September 
1946 to January 1948
The National Convention, an elected assembly established by the Brit-
ish government to advise on the form of government that would be 
appropriate for Newfoundland and Labrador after the Second World 
War, was a very important and underrated body that had major influ-
ences on the future of what was to become Canada’s tenth province. It 
instituted a thorough review of the state of affairs in Newfoundland 
and Labrador at the time, with background reports prepared and de-
bated on such crucial issues as education, the fisheries, and the financial 
prospects of the country. The Convention favoured several policy di-
rections that were later implemented by the first post-Confederation 
provincial government. These included elevating Memorial University 
College into a full-fledged degree-granting university, and promoting 
the redirection of the Newfoundland and Labrador fisheries more to-
wards fresh frozen production for the American market and away 
from salted, dried cod for overseas markets.3
Joey Smallwood was elected as a member of the National Con-
vention. Although he was not a member of the Fisheries Committee 
of the Convention, he was assiduous in his review of the Committee’s 
report, in conducting his own investigation of fisheries issues, and in 
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contributing to the Convention’s debates about the report. In light of 
his subsequent leadership role in transforming the fisheries, his com-
ments during the debates are insightful.
I have very genuine admiration for the work of the Fisher-
ies Committee in the preparation of this interim report. . . . 
I have often wondered whether it was a good thing for 
Newfoundland to turn away from her centuries-old 
method of fishing. I do not refer merely to the technical 
methods of fishing, but to the social or sociological; we 
have had 30, 40 and 50,000 petty capitalists — whether it 
is a good thing to turn away from that and to industrialize 
the fishing and increase the units of production; to in-
crease mechanical processing; turn the fishery from what 
it has so long been, an adventure, a highly individualistic 
adventure, developing a certain sturdy independence and 
individualism in our fishermen; turning from that into 
what can only be called industrialism in the fishery, reach-
ing perhaps ultimately someday to the fishery proletariat 
— men engaged for wages as they might be in a clothing 
factory, in a mine or paper mill or any other industrial en-
terprise. . . . My head tells me that we must change; we 
must become industrialized; we must go ahead or go under; 
yet I will watch this trend to industrialism in the fisheries 
with a great deal of interest in the next ten, 20 or 30 years, 
if I live that long. I know it must come; it is inevitable and 
indeed it may be regrettable.4
Smallwood’s ambivalence about the changes he foresaw for the fishing 
industry and rural Newfoundland and Labrador more generally was to 
colour his whole career in politics.
Despite making himself quite knowledgeable about fisheries issues, 
Smallwood, no doubt because he was so passionately committed to the 
Confederation cause, proved to be somewhat naive about the implica-
tions of joining the Canadian federation for control and management 
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of the fisheries. During the National Convention debates, he argued 
that “any regulations they make governing the fisheries . . . all the prac-
tical details of fishery, that is left entirely completely and absolutely to 
the province.”5 Fellow Convention member Charles Bailey disagreed, 
stating “That is not what I was given to understand.”6 In the event, 
Bailey’s understanding was to prove correct. In negotiating the Terms 
of Union, the Newfoundland delegation could have championed an 
approach giving a significant say in fisheries administration to the new 
province of Newfoundland, but this did not happen. Sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over fisheries resources and their management passed 
seamlessly to the federal government and its Department of Fisheries. 
Fisheries Development during the Smallwood Years, 1949–1972
The attention given to Smallwood’s land-based industrialization 
schemes, and, indeed, the exaggerated claims about them that he pro-
moted, far exceeded the attention given to fisheries. Aidan Maloney 
was heavily involved in various fisheries capacities during the Small-
wood years, including as a senior manager for John Penny and Sons in 
Ramea, assistant deputy minister of fisheries in the provincial govern-
ment, and as minister of fisheries in Smallwood’s cabinet. In his opinion, 
although Smallwood received more publicity for his other industrial-
ization schemes, he was nevertheless also heavily involved in fisheries 
development:
No one got excited when Fishery Products or Bonavista 
Cold Storage got a loan of $2 million to buy trawlers. That 
was not the kind of thing that got political attention. If 
there was a ten-storey building to be built, everybody 
could see it. If there was a school, a regional high school or 
something like that, that attracted attention. That had 
much more political moxie than somebody buying three 
or four trawlers in Britain or something like that. Joe 
didn’t ignore the fisheries, in fairness to him. But he didn’t 
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sermonize about it in his talks, they were always on devel-
opment in other areas.7
Earlier, during the debates of the National Convention, Small-
wood had expressed his faith in the future of the fisheries as follows:
I have absolute faith in the basic possibilities of the New-
foundland fisheries. We must never forget that over half 
our entire economy consists of the fisheries and half of the 
population is directly affected by the fisheries, and that the 
remainder who are not directly affected, are certainly so in 
an indirect way. Everyone in Newfoundland stands or falls 
in the long run by the fisheries. We must not make the 
mistake of neglecting the fisheries.8
He then went on to outline a seven-point plan for what he thought 
needed to be done to modernize the Newfoundland fishery so that it 
could be competitive with progressive countries such as Iceland and 
Norway. This included bringing down the cost of production, scientific 
research, new methods of production and processing, bringing in outside 
capital, emphasizing organization by building on the work of the Fish-
eries Board and the Fish Exports Group, encouraging the co-operative 
movement, and establishing a separate Department of Fisheries.
After he became premier, Smallwood attempted to follow through 
on much of this. One of his first actions was to set up a Department of 
Fisheries and Co-operatives. In keeping with his earlier socialist lean-
ings and his admiration of William Coaker’s Fishermen’s Protective 
Union, Smallwood was a keen supporter of the co-operative move-
ment and appointed a well-known co-operative leader, Fred Scott, to 
be his first deputy minister of co-operatives within the new depart-
ment. Later, impatient to see economic development happen quickly, 
Smallwood’s interest in the co-op movement seemed to wane.
During Smallwood’s 22 years as premier, the fishing industry of 
Newfoundland and Labrador changed dramatically. Despite his reser-
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vations about what he saw as the inevitable erosion of the outport 
lifestyle, which was based on a small-boat inshore fishery with family- 
based production of dried, salted codfish, Smallwood championed the 
industrialization of the Newfoundland fishing industry. This meant, 
on the harvesting side, building up the offshore fleet of trawlers and 
encouraging inshore fishermen to graduate to longliners, which were 
viewed as being more efficient than the traditional dories and trap 
skiffs. On the processing side, the government encouraged and helped 
to capitalize the growth of factory-like fish plants to produce frozen 
fish. Gradually, over 15 years, industrially produced frozen fish re-
placed the traditional salt fish as Newfoundland’s main seafood export. 
Both the federal government and the provincial government invested 
heavily in supporting this transformation.
Despite his criticism of Smallwood’s purported lack of attention 
to the fishery, as quoted above, Richard Gwyn actually appears to con-
tradict himself by going on to describe some of Smallwood’s early ef-
forts at fisheries development. In 1950, Smallwood recruited Clive 
Planta, originally from British Columbia and who was then serving as 
manager of the Fisheries Council of Canada, to serve as his deputy 
minister of fisheries. They organized a joint federal–provincial study of 
the Newfoundland fishery, chaired by Sir Albert Walsh, the chief jus-
tice of Newfoundland, who had been a member of the delegation that 
negotiated the Terms of Union between Canada and Newfoundland. 
The 1952 Walsh Report recommended a $100 million fisheries devel-
opment program to be jointly financed by Newfoundland and Ottawa.
But, as Gwyn points out, “Ottawa, in those days, had scant con-
cern for a decaying fishery on an island two thousand miles away.”9 
The federal cabinet summarily dismissed the Walsh Report’s recom-
mendations. In 1954, Ottawa also rejected Smallwood and Planta’s 
request to establish a provincial marketing board that would process, 
package, and market Newfoundland fish. Smallwood’s optimistic ex-
pectations about federal jurisdiction whereby the province would be in 
charge of the “practical details,” as expressed during the National Con-
vention, were coming back to haunt him. Far from being disinterested 
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in the plight of the fisheries, Smallwood was so discouraged by Ottawa’s 
indifference that he even “began to question the benefits of Confeder-
ation itself.”10
Smallwood was adamant that he and his government strongly 
supported development of the fisheries as part of their overall ap-
proach to economic development. In an interview I did with him in 
1978, six years after he had stepped down as premier, I asked him how 
he would respond to the criticism that some people were making that 
he and his government had neglected the fisheries. His response is 
worth quoting at length, not only because it expresses his own claims 
about his efforts at fisheries development but also because it offers a 
good example of Smallwood’s colourful style of political rhetoric. I 
had said: “I suppose some people have criticized the policies of your 
era, saying that fisheries were neglected too much.” He cut in:
. . . positively, very loudly and very frequently! The answer 
to it is this: that we have in Newfoundland today some-
thing around 30 great fish plants, employing about 10,000 
people. Think of that. That’s the largest single industry in 
the province. Do you know how many of the 30 plants 
there are in Newfoundland that have been opened since I 
went out of office? Not one. Zero. Zilch. Nara one at all, 
okay? Not one since I went out. How many were built by 
me or enabled by me to be built? Out of 30, there was the 
one in Harbour Grace, and we lent them several millions, 
but we didn’t put it there. We didn’t put the one in Grand 
Bank — yes we did — we financed that completely. We 
put the one in Fortune. We did not put the one in Burin, 
but we put millions of dollars in it to enlarge it. We put all 
the money in the one in Marystown, all the money in the 
one in Trepassey — all the plants up and down the South-
ern Shore — there was perhaps one in Port aux Basques, 
we put the one in Gaultois, we put the one in Harbour 
Breton, we put the one in Burgeo, we put the one in Car-
bonear, we put the one in Bay de Verde, we put the one in 
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Old Perlican, we put two in Catalina, we put the one in 
Twillingate, one in St. Anthony, one in Port aux Choix. 
We put — my administration — of the 30 fish plants in 
Newfoundland today, we put all but four of them — that’s 
26 plants we put in — that’s how much we were against 
the fishery! And we introduced the longliner — and there 
are 800 of them now — we brought in the longliners and 
we financed them. We created a fisheries loan board and 
lent money to thousands of fishermen to buy boats and 
engines and fishing gear — thousands of fishermen. Again 
and again, I went on the air and pleaded with people. I 
said: “We have the money, government has the money, we 
want to spend it on the development of the fishery. Please 
come to us, come to us if you want to develop, if you want 
to start a fish plant, if you want to get a new boat, if you 
want to get an engine, if you want to get fishing gear.” 
We have a fisheries development board — we have two 
actually — we have the Fishing Development Authority 
and the Fisheries Loan Board.
He went on to argue, convincingly in light of the drastic decline 
in fish stocks in subsequent years, that the fundamental problem was 
that people within the industry were losing faith due to market diffi-
culties and declining fish stocks.
The fishing industry did not attract people. People were 
losing faith. I remember when there were 1,000 schooners 
every year, 1,000 schooners every year going down to the 
Labrador fishing. I saw it fall from 1,000 a year to 800 a 
year to 500 a year. I saw it fall to 300 a year, I saw it drop 
to 200 a year, I saw it drop to 100 vessels a year, I saw it 
drop to 50 a year, I saw it drop to three vessels — from 
1,000 Labrador schooners a year going down to Labrador 
from Newfoundland, I saw it fall down until there were 
only three.
[The decline] was irreversible at that time. The price 
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of fish was such, the markets were such, the amount of fish 
attainable was such that people in the fishing industry it-
self, the fishermen, the skippers, the plant owners — they 
had lost faith, had lost hope in it. Notwithstanding the 
tens and tens and tens of millions of dollars which my 
administration poured in. I started something, and I’m 
very proud of this. Before they were all built I was out of 
office. But I started it, the garages, the marine garages, the 
marine service stations. The first one I think I put over in 
Harbour Grace, and I put dozens of them around New-
foundland, where you could take your boat in, and a mar-
vellous machine would lift that boat out of the water and 
bring it into the garages. The servicing of the boats, the 
larger boats especially — the longliners — the first garages, 
not for trucks and cars and motor buses and skidoos and 
such, but for boats, I started them.
Joey the politician no doubt exaggerated his claims about his con-
tributions to fisheries development, and his tendency to attribute all 
his government’s accomplishments, including those supported by gen-
erous federal dollars, to himself personally, is irritating and probably 
worked against him towards the end of his career. But there is no 
doubt that his government made significant investments in fisheries 
development. And, in hindsight, his concerns about the decline in fish 
stocks seem prescient. This also helps explain why Smallwood believed 
that, in addition to a modernized fishery, he also had to turn to other 
industries for the economic development he craved.
A premier of a Canadian province, even one as energetic and 
hard-working as Joey Smallwood, can only achieve so much. To be 
effective at all, he or she has to focus on some priorities more than 
others. It was never likely that Smallwood’s obsession with making 
economic development happen quickly would be easily compatible 
with fisheries development, which, by comparison with his big indus-
trial dreams, was a slow process. In addition, in a sense Smallwood was 
hoist by his own petard with respect to fisheries, in that Newfoundland 
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had surrendered sovereignty over its offshore fisheries resources at 
Confederation. Smallwood was hopeful that the Canadian government, 
with its greater resources of capital and technical expertise, would pro-
vide the leadership, direction, and investment needed to modernize 
the Newfoundland fisheries effectively. This happened to some extent 
— the federal Department of Fisheries (later Fisheries and Oceans) 
did invest significant funds in research and development. But this never 
happened in the wholesale, targeted way that Smallwood hoped for.
From the federal government’s point of view, despite the addition 
of Newfoundland and Labrador bringing about a one-third expansion 
of Canada’s fisheries, there appeared to be no need to tailor its ap-
proach to the specific needs of the Newfoundland fisheries; rather, the 
great fisheries resources offshore Newfoundland and Labrador were 
incorporated into the even greater fisheries resources of Canada as a 
whole. These were now Canadian resources under federal government 
jurisdiction and, except for a five-year transition process, they were to 
be treated in the same way as fisheries had been treated by the federal 
Department of Fisheries before 1949. This can clearly be seen through 
reviewing the federal department’s annual reports for the years leading 
up to and immediately following Confederation. The 1948–49 report 
makes no mention at all of Newfoundland.11 The 1949–50 report 
states, without commentary, that of the two billion pounds of fish 
caught in Canada for that year, approximately one-third came from 
Newfoundland, one-third from the Maritime provinces and Quebec, 
and one-third from British Columbia and the inland provinces. Ex-
penditures by province were as follows: Newfoundland, $940,181; 
Nova Scotia, $1,287,563; New Brunswick, $1,044,490; British Colum-
bia, $1,981,448.12 The great fisheries of Newfoundland and Labrador 
were simply incorporated into the workings of the federal Department 
of Fisheries as another region to be managed and administered in the 
same way as the already established regions. No strategy or plan was 
tailor-made to this region. Indeed, it became common, as in the 1950–51 
annual report, to refer to “the problems of the Atlantic coast fisher-
men” and “the problems” of Newfoundland in particular.13
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A decade later, clearly disappointed at how fisheries development 
was progressing in the new province, Smallwood took to the air. In an 
impassioned province-wide radio and television address, printed ver-
batim in the Evening Telegram in 1962,14 Smallwood reiterated his 
faith in and concern about the fisheries, pointing out that 32 of the 41 
electoral districts in the province at that time were largely dependent 
on the fisheries. In his words: 
It is only a mockery to say that Newfoundland is going 
ahead if our fisheries do not go ahead. It is essential that the 
fishing industry shall flourish and expand. What we need 
to bring this about is a new policy; a new program; a new 
scheme; we need to get our fishery onto a new foundation.
He went on to admit, however, that although “I feel that something 
special, something big, must be done for our fisheries, I don’t know 
what it is.” But he disclaimed that it was neither the provincial nor the 
federal government’s responsibility to set this “new foundation,” al-
though it would be their responsibility to support it once it was estab-
lished. Instead, and somewhat surprisingly given his earlier disdain for 
“the merchants of Water Street,” he argued that “it is the duty of the 
merchants to create the actual program or plan,” although he later 
amended this to read the merchants’ and the fishermen’s duty.
To this end, Smallwood called for a great convention of merchants 
and fishermen to devise such a plan, with federal and provincial officials 
to play a supportive role. Such a convention was held but the merchants 
and fishermen that Smallwood challenged were unable to produce the 
fisheries development plan that he hoped for. Smallwood and his gov-
ernment nevertheless continued to work towards such a plan. Given 
that the Terms of Union had conceded jurisdiction over fisheries to 
Ottawa, Smallwood attempted to convince the federal government to 
embark on a national approach to fisheries development, modelled on 
its national agriculture policy. He pursued this personally during a fed-
eral–provincial conference on fisheries development in 1964.
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The federal government’s position on fisheries jurisdiction was 
and remains unequivocal. As stated in a background paper prepared 
for the conference, based on the British North America Act of 1867, 
“the parliament of Canada has exclusive legislation authority over 
fisheries as such, both coastal and inland”; and, even in tidal waters, 
“the provincial legislature is entirely without jurisdiction.”15
For Smallwood, the 1964 conference was meant to be pivotal in 
his attempts at fisheries development. He was the only provincial pre-
mier who personally led his province’s delegation to the conference. 
Implicitly conceding that federal jurisdiction was non-negotiable, he 
hoped to convince the federal government to develop and implement 
a national fisheries policy modelled on agriculture policy. In his ad-
dress to the conference, Smallwood advocated as follows:
Based upon the programmes and accomplishments in ag-
riculture, it is possible to define in relatively precise terms 
the objectives of a National Fisheries Policy. The following 
should be the agreed objectives:
1. To create an environment of price stability essen-
tial for development, employing whatever means 
are necessary, including marketing boards.
2. To increase productivity.
3. To expand markets.
4. To initiate community development.
5. To improve and standardize product quality.
He went on to argue that “if policy is designed to achieve these objec-
tives there is no reason why the progress that has typified agriculture 
could not also become typical of fisheries.”16
Despite the Newfoundland premier’s direct advocacy to the confer-
ence, the proposal for a national fisheries policy was rejected. This was a 
great disappointment to Smallwood and the Newfoundland delegation. 
Unlike agriculture, fisheries had no great national appeal.17 Neverthe-
less, as Aidan Maloney, the assistant deputy minister of fisheries at the 
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time and a member of the Newfoundland delegation, points out, some of 
the measures proposed by the province were eventually acted on in a 
piecemeal way rather than as part of an integrated policy. These included 
the community stage program and a bait-for-fishermen program, both 
of which were very helpful for Newfoundland fish harvesters and fish-
ing communities.
Another important initiative was the establishment of a national 
body to coordinate the marketing of salt fish, the Canadian Salt Fish 
Corporation. Maloney himself, by then a member of Smallwood’s 
cabinet, was to resign from the provincial government in 1969 to head 
up the Corporation. The Corporation was successful during its first 
years, but soon found itself troubled by the decreasing size of New-
foundland codfish. The best markets for salt fish were in Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, and Brazil. Although Newfoundland had been well established 
in those markets, as the average size of fish from Newfoundland de-
creased, buyers, who were looking for fairly thick pieces of fish, began 
to switch to other producers in Norway and Iceland. In Maloney’s 
words: “Oh, it was terrible. I saw what the Norwegians and the Ice-
landers were putting into Brazil and there was no way in God’s name 
that we could compete.” Small salt fish from Newfoundland and 
Labrador could then only be sold in poorer markets in Puerto Rico, 
Jamaica, and Barbados. This was not profitable and the decline in the 
historic salt fish trade hastened the transformation to the production 
of frozen cod for the US market.18 The Canadian Salt Fish Corpora-
tion was eventually shut down in 1994.
The decline in the size of codfish from the waters off Newfound-
land and Labrador in the 1970s was a dire harbinger of the subsequent 
decline of stocks during the 1980s leading up to the devastating cod 
moratorium of 1992. In 1973, Maloney had written to Jack Davis, 
then the federal minister of fisheries, warning about the decline in the 
size of fish and the loss of the big mother fish that were crucial for 
reproduction. But, in Maloney’s words, “I was a voice in the wilder-
ness. . . . The politics of the resource had no time for that sort of thing.”
During the Smallwood years, the conservation of fish stocks was 
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not seen as an issue. From 1948 to 1961 world fish landings doubled. 
Rather than worry about the future of the resource, Canada was 
committed to becoming more competitive with foreign fishing na-
tions, which at the time were taking about two-thirds of Atlantic 
groundfish landings. The issue was: how can we build up our own na-
tional harvesting capacity to compete with the larger vessels and ad-
vanced technology of the foreign fleets? From this perspective, the 
inshore fisheries of Newfoundland and Labrador were perceived as 
being out-of-date, old-fashioned, and unproductive. 
Smallwood himself never took a clear stand on this matter. On the 
one hand, he bought into the argument that the fisheries had to be 
modernized and industrialized to become competitive and thereby suc-
cessful. On the other hand, he admired the culture and way of life of 
outport Newfoundland, and, more to the point, was dependent on the 
outports for their continued political support. Not surprisingly, in that 
context the Smallwood government (and subsequent provincial gov-
ernments) continued to support the inshore fisheries through bounties 
and subsidies to both fish harvesters and inshore processing plants.19
Smallwood was also concerned about the welfare of fishermen and 
their families, whose incomes from fishing were low by national stan-
dards. While seasonal fish plant workers were able to supplement their 
income through regular unemployment insurance (UI), this was not 
initially the case for fishers, who were seen as self-employed and there-
fore ineligible for UI. Smallwood and Jack Pickersgill, Newfoundland’s 
influential representative in the federal cabinet, were keen to change 
that situation. Pickersgill, who had been a successful senior public 
servant in Ottawa before turning to politics, knew how to work the 
Ottawa system. Pickersgill had to convince his cabinet colleagues to 
overcome “the stubborn resistance of the bureaucracy.” He dealt with 
the matter of fishermen being seen as self-employed by proposing that 
the law be changed such that the merchants who bought the fish would 
be deemed employers for insurance purposes. Eventually, convincing 
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent that he could not face his constitu-
ents in Bonavista-Twillingate unless fishermen were covered, he got his 
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way in cabinet. The Unemployment Insurance Act was amended and 
fishermen became eligible for UI as of 1 April 1957. Proud of his success, 
Pickersgill states in his autobiography: “I regarded my part in securing 
the extension of unemployment insurance to fishermen as my most 
substantial contribution to my constituents and of Newfoundland in 
general.”20
Unemployment insurance for both fish harvesters and fish plant 
workers had a profound influence in maintaining the rural lifestyles of 
people in Newfoundland and Labrador outports for many years. Al-
though not specifically designed as such, the UI program for fish har-
vesters really functioned as a form of income supplementation for 
low-earning primary producers in a seasonal industry. While a strong 
case can be made for such an income supplementation scheme (pref-
erably, one designed for the purpose) on equity and community devel-
opment grounds, it was criticized by both mainstream economists and 
many government officials for its economic impacts. One economist, 
William Schrank of Memorial University, later even went so far as to 
contend that fishermen’s UI “became the single greatest hindrance to 
the long term adjustment of the Canadian Atlantic fishery into a com-
mercially viable industry.”21
Schrank’s contention is consistent with the dominant academic 
paradigm that characterized economists’ views of fisheries develop-
ment throughout the second half of the twentieth century, both glob-
ally and within Canada. Harking back to Scott Gordon’s influential 
argument about “the tragedy of the commons” and Parzival Copes’s 
contention that there were too many fishing communities and too 
many fishermen in coastal Newfoundland and Labrador, this domi-
nant economic view shaped the thinking of most federal government 
officials and several provincial officials as well.22 According to this eco-
nomic paradigm and its market-driven logic, communities, families, 
and individuals should “adjust” to the tough economic realities by 
finding alternative employment, moving to larger centres in New-
foundland, or migrating to mainland Canada in search of work. The 
disruption to these people’s lives — giving up their homes, trying to 
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retrain for unfamiliar jobs, seeing their children move away, was sim-
ply part of the cost of progress.
The most cogent critique of this paradigm during the post-war 
years was articulated by the Hungarian-American political economist, 
Karl Polanyi, who argued that this market-driven mentality has its own 
contradictions in the disruption it can inflict on people and the envi-
ronment.23 In the case of fisheries, the world has paid the price in the 
over-exploitation of fish stocks and degradation of the marine environ-
ment due to the rapacious activities of highly mechanized (productive, 
efficient) industrial fishing fleets. In Canada, Newfoundland and Lab-
rador would suffer severely from this during the 1990s and beyond.
Joey Smallwood, and many other politicians at the time and subse-
quently, felt instinctively uncomfortable about the dire consequences for 
communities and people that would be entailed by a too rigid adherence 
to the economic, market-driven paradigm.24 They lacked an articulate 
alternative paradigm, but, pragmatically, they recognized the value in 
human terms of thriving small communities, outport culture, and sus-
tainable marine ecosystems. For social and cultural as well as political 
reasons, they engaged in the subsidization of inshore fish harvesters and 
fish plants, and income supplementation through unemployment insur-
ance and, where needed, social assistance. If this was upsetting to aca-
demic economists and Ottawa bureaucrats, then so be it.
Fisheries, Industrialization, and Modernization
Premier Joseph Smallwood did not neglect the fisheries. Rather, the 
industrialization and modernization of the fisheries were as much a part 
of his overall approach to economic development as were his higher- 
profile efforts at diversification through small-scale manufacturing and 
large-scale resource projects. Smallwood actively supported the indus-
trialization of the fisheries during the 1950s through loans and subsi-
dies to the province’s largest fishing companies so they could invest in 
offshore trawlers and modern fish plants to produce frozen products.25
Smallwood’s ambivalence about tradition and modernity, and his 
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political pragmatism, also informed his controversial community cen-
tralization program, better known as the resettlement program. He 
had a mandate to modernize rural Newfoundland and Labrador — to 
provide electricity, roads, schools, and access to health care to the peo-
ple of the new province, to ensure that they enjoyed the same services 
and benefits as Canadians in other provinces. The cost of this modern-
ization, however, was very high. The cost of providing modern services 
to every small community in every small offshore island and remote 
coastal location would have been prohibitive. Pragmatically, it made 
sense that, if people in such communities agreed to move to more 
central locations, then they could enjoy the benefits of modern services 
and amenities.  
Resettlement occurred in two phases. The first, a provincial-only 
program that offered limited financial support from 1954 to 1965, saw 
115 communities and about 8,000 people resettled. The second, a joint 
federal–provincial program that provided more generous support from 
1965 to 1970, saw a further 119 communities and 16,114 people reset-
tled. In addition to making modern amenities and services more read-
ily available, the latter program also aimed to require people to move 
into designated “growth centres,” with the hope that, in keeping with 
economic agglomeration theory, the larger centres would allow for 
more industrial growth and business and employment spinoffs.26 The 
main industry that would encourage this sort of development was the 
frozen fish industry. During the 1970s and 1980s many towns in 
Newfoundland, for example La Scie, Arnold’s Cove, Trepassey, and 
Catalina, did enjoy growth through the establishment and expansion 
of modern fish plants that provided income and employment to many 
rural men and women in these towns and their surrounding areas. 
These plants, however, were not clearly tied into the formal federal–
provincial resettlement program. Many of those who moved settled in 
smaller communities where new economic opportunities were scarce. 
A lot of fishers were dislocated from their traditional fishing grounds, 
and there is little evidence to support the claim that the growth-pole 
approach worked for this program.
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Government-sponsored resettlement (as compared to voluntary 
resettlement, of which there was a lot as well) also caused serious social 
disruptions and psychological hardships for many people. As described 
in an article at the Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage website:
There were significant problems. Three groups had the 
most difficulty: the elderly, widows, and large family 
households. The biggest issue was the availability of af-
fordable housing. For many it was a double loss. Houses in 
the communities left behind were worthless, and even 
with relocation assistance, few could afford to buy or build 
new homes elsewhere. The elderly, with little chance of 
earning a living, could not afford to start again. Widows 
were in much the same position, especially those with 
young children. Families with large numbers of children 
could not afford to build houses suitable to their needs, 
and there were few homes available that could accommo-
date large families.27
Resettlement also caused a lot of anxiety for people who lived in small 
communities and feared that they were on “the government list” slated 
for resettlement. In some regions, notably Fogo Island, local commu-
nities organized to oppose resettlement and lobbied instead for local 
community development. Politically, controversy about resettlement 
became the first chink in the armour to Smallwood’s hold on rural 
Newfoundland and provided an opportunity for a revitalized Progres-
sive Conservative Party to appeal to rural voters in the 1970s.
After his disappointing attempt to persuade the federal govern-
ment to pursue a great national fisheries policy, modelled on its na-
tional agriculture policy, it wasn’t so much that Smallwood neglected 
or gave up on the fisheries, but that (like most premiers who succeeded 
him) he was unsure of how best to proceed. Turning his own economic 
development energies to large-scale industrial resource projects, he left 
fisheries matters more in the hands of his provincial minister of fish-
eries and the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans.
NLS_33.2_4pp.indd   453 2019-01-17   12:22 PM
454
House
newfoundland and labrador studies, 33, 2 (2018)
1719-1726
Conclusion
What can we conclude about the claim that “Smallwood neglected the 
fisheries”? Edward Roberts, who worked with Smallwood for many 
years, first as executive assistant and later as a cabinet minister,28 sup-
ports the contention that “Smallwood never said ‘burn your boats.’ 
Everybody says he said it, but nobody has ever said here’s the speech, 
or here’s the letter, or here’s the document. In any event, Smallwood 
spent millions on the fishery.”29 In her historical overview of federal 
and provincial involvement in the industrialization of the New-
foundland fishery from 1934 to 1968, Miriam Wright agrees about 
Smallwood that “the man who wrapped himself in the banner of Con-
federation, led Newfoundland into Canada, and then reigned for over 
two decades made a profound impact on the fishery.”30
One could argue that, during the debates of the National Conven-
tion and during the negotiations of the Terms of Union, Smallwood 
(as well as other delegates) did indeed neglect the fisheries by too easily 
surrendering control over one of the world’s great fisheries resources to 
the Canadian government, for whom fisheries were and continue to be 
of minor importance in the overall scheme of national affairs, domi-
nated by the concerns of Ontario, Quebec, and the western provinces. 
Time would prove that Smallwood had been unduly optimistic about 
the purported advantages of surrendering sovereignty over fisheries 
and other offshore resources to the federal government. He failed to 
appreciate that the mindset of federal fisheries officials, conditioned by 
the conventional economic thinking of the time, would have negative 
consequences not only for most of Newfoundland and Labrador’s 
fishing communities, but also for the abundant stocks of cod and other 
fish species offshore the island and the coast of Labrador. Once juris-
diction is surrendered it is extremely difficult if not impossible to get 
it back, as subsequent premiers were to learn. Brian Peckford in partic-
ular was to fight passionately but unsuccessfully for joint management 
of fisheries, based on the model of the Atlantic Accord for joint federal– 
provincial management of offshore oil and gas.
NLS_33.2_4pp.indd   454 2019-01-17   12:22 PM
455
Did Smallwood Neglect the Fisheries?
newfoundland and labrador studies, 33, 2 (2018)
1719-1726
Given that after Confederation in 1949 Newfoundland and Lab-
rador no longer had jurisdiction over its fisheries resources, a dispas-
sionate review of the provincial government’s fisheries policies and 
programs during Joey Smallwood’s long tenure as premier shows that 
fisheries issues were important to his government’s efforts at economic 
development. Smallwood was indeed passionately committed to eco-
nomic development through small-scale manufacturing and large-
scale resource projects. These highly publicized efforts tended to over-
shadow his government’s support for the fisheries. The Smallwood 
government’s attempts at fisheries development should be viewed as 
part of its overall approach to development, not neglected but rather 
one important component of his ambitious program to, in his famous 
phrase, “develop or perish.”
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